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Statement of the Case
DAFCO LLC CDAFCO") I routinely disregarded deadlines and procedures throughout
the proceedings before the district court. Nmv on appeal, DAFCO asks this Court to overlook
the pattern of abuse.
This case involves the enforcement of the terms of a title insurance policy issued by
Stewart Title Guaranty Company ("Stev,:art") and escrow closing services provided by
AmeriTitle, Inc. ("AmeriTitle") related to a spec home built by Joshua M. Jarvis. In March
2008. M1'. Jarvis sought a construction loan from Snake River Funding, Inc. (,'Snake River
Funding"). R. p. 427. On March 13.2008, M1'. Jarvis, as grantor, executed a deed of trust (the
"Insured Deed of Trust") for the benefit of Snake River Funding, which gave Snake River
Funding a security interest in the real property on which Mr. Jarvis intended to build the spec
home. R. pp. 95-96, and 360; see New Phase Investments, LLC v. Jarvis. 153 Idaho 207, 208,
280 P.3d 710, 711 (2012).

A. The Title Policy
On March 18, 2008, Stewart issued a Loan Policy of Title Insurance to Snake River
Funding with an insurance amount of $268,000.00 (the "Title Policy") for the Insured Deed of
Trust. R. pp. 65-77 and 96-97. Stewart entered into no other agreement and/or contract with

I A Complaint in this matter was originally filed on January 15,2010 and named two nonexistent entities - "Snake River Funding, LLC" and "D.A.F.CO., LLC" R. pp. 012-016. The
Plaintiffs eventually amended their Complaint to change "Snake River Fund, LLC" to "Snake
River Funding, Inc." and "D.A.F.C.O., LLC" to "DAFCO LLC" although the correct name of
the entity is "DAFCO LLC".
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River Funding

than the Title Policy.

K p. 511, ~[9;

p.90,

p.91,LL
AmeriTitle was not a party to the Title Policy. R. pp. 65-77. AmeriTitle did not insure
DAFCO under the Title Policy or have any other obligations under the Title Policy. K pp. 6577, and; 505, ~[25.
The Title Policy includes various provisions regarding how an insured must submit a
claim, how Stewart may handle a claim, how litigation and appeals may be pursued, and what
liability Stewart has under the Title Policy for any losses or damages claimed by the insured. K
pp. 65-77. The district court determined and DAFCO did not dispute that the terms and
provisions of the Title Policy are clear and unambiguous. K pp. 365 and 368; see R. pp. 95-107.
The Title Policy does not require payment to an insured merely because a third-party may
challenge the validity or priority of the Insured Deed of Trust. K pp. 65-77; Tr. p. 90, Lns. 9-16.
Section 7 of the "Conditions" portion of the Title Policy allows, but does not require, Stewart to
settle a claim by paying or tendering the amount of the insurance or otherwise settling with the
insured. R. p. 68. Sections 5(b) and 5(c) of the "Conditions" portion of the Title Policy provide
options for Stewart to pursue when the Insured Deed of Trust is challenged:
(b)
The Company shall have the right, in addition to the options contained in
Section 7 of these Conditions, at its own cost to institute and prosecute any action
or proceeding or to do any other act that in its opinion may be necessary or
desirable to establish the Title or the lien of the Insured Mortgage, as Insured, or
to prevent or reduce loss or damage to the Insured. The exercise of these rights
shall not be an admission of liability or waiver of any provision of this policy. If
the Company exercises its rights under this subjection, it must do so diligently.
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(c) Whenever the Company brings action or asserts a defense as required or
permitted by this policy, the Company may pursue the litigation to a final
determination by a court of competent jurisdiction. and it expressly reserves the
right. in its sole discretion, to appeal any adverse judgment or order.
K p. 68, §§ 5(b) and (c) (emphasis added).
The Title Policy provides that if the validity of the Insured Deed of Trust is upheld in
litigation or on appeal, Stewart is not responsible for any loss or damage to the insured. R. p. 69,
§ 9. Specifically, Section 9(a) of the "Conditions" portion of the Title Policy provides as

follows:
If the Company establishes the title, or removes the alleged defect, lien, or
encumbrance, or cures the lack of a right of access to or from the Land, or cures
the claim of Unmarketable Title, or establishes the lien of the Insured Mortgage,
all as insured, in a reasonably diligent manner by any method, including
litigation and the completion of any appeals, it shall have fully performed its
obligations with respect to that matter and shall not be liable for any loss or
damage caused to the insured.
R. p. 69, § 9(a) (emphasis added). Section 9(b) of the "Conditions" portion of the Title
Policy provides further:
In the event of any litigation, including litigation by the Company or with the
Company's consent, the Company shall have no liability for loss or damage until
there has been a final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and
disposition of all appeals, adverse to the Title or to the lien of the Insured
Mortgage, as insured.
K p. 69, § 9(b) (emphasis added).

B. The Closing Instructions
Mr. Jarvis and Snake River Funding used AmeriTitle's escrow services to close their loan
transaction. K p. 502, <j[ 9. Mr. Jarvis and Snake River Funding as parties to the escrow closing
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submitted

to AmeriTitle (the "Closing Instructions"). R. pp.

509. DAFCO was not a party to the Closing Instructions. R. pp. 508-509; Tr. p. 81, Lns.
Ste\vart was not a party to the Closing Instructions and did not have any responsibility under the
escrow closing. R. pp. 505,508-509, and 511, 9191 9 and 23-24: Tr. p. 90, L 9

p. 91, L8.

The Closing Instructions set forth certain documents and other items required from each
party prior to close of the escrow transaction. R. p. 503, 9[ II. The Closing Instructions did not
obligate AmeriTitle to obtain the signature of Mrs. Jarvis. Tr. p. 92, Lns. 4-7. AmeriTitle was
only required to provide form documents to Snake River Funding and Mr. Jarvis for their
transaction. R. p. 503, qr9r 1 14. AmeriTitle did not draft documents for the parties. R. p. 503, 9[
14. AmeriTitle merely acted as scrivener under instructions from Snake River Funding and Mr.
Jarvis to provide a form deed of trust. Tr. p. 92, Lns. 1-6; R. p. 503, 91 15.
The clear and unambiguous Closing Instructions signed by Snake River Funding provide
in pertinent part:
The closing agent is directed to comply with the instructions contained in these
instructions and the parties hereto agree to indemnify and hold harmless the
closing agent from any and all actions or losses related hereto other than failure to
comply herewith, including but not limited to any attorney's fees or costs incurred
by the closing agent in defending itself in any such action.
BY THEIR EXECUTION OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS, THE BUYER AND
SELLER ACKNOWLEDGE THE FOLLOWING:
1) The closing agent is not acting as a representative of either party,
2) The documents prepared in connection with this transaction will affect the legal
rights of the parties, and the parties rights or interests in those documents may
differ,
3) Any documents typed by the closing agent have been done so at our direction or
the direction of our counsel,
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5)
6)

7)

8)

the content of the documents, nor advice as to the merits of the transaction has
been offered by the closing agent
Copies of the Subdivision Plat and Restrictive Covenants where applicable,
AmeriTitle shall not be responsible for any penalties, or loss of principal or
interest or any delays in the investment pursuant to our instructions, nor shall
AmeriTitle be liable for any loss or impairment of funds while those funds are on
deposit in a financial institution if such loss or impairment results from the failure,
insolvency or suspension of financial institution.
Idaho Code 55-2501, et seq. is known as the "Idaho Property Condition
Disclosure Act" and this transaction may be affected by the Act AmeriTitle has
advised you to seek separate advise regarding the law and AmeriTitle has not
given you any advise about the law that is not contained in these Closing
Instructions. With the execution of these Closing Instructions you are certifying
that compliance with the law, if applicable, has been accomplished outside of
closing.
THE CLOSING AGENT HAS ADVISED THE PARTIES HERETO TO SEEK
THE ADVICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IF ANY PART OF THIS
TRANSACTION IS NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD.

R. p. 509 (underlined emphasis added).
C. Assignment of Insured Deed of Trust to DAFCO

On April 17, 2008 (a month after the escrow closing), Snake River Funding assigned its
rights under the Insured Deed of Trust to DAFCO. R. pp. 360 and 548. After ML Jarvis
executed the Insured Deed of Trust, ML Jarvis and his wife, Rebecca Jarvis, executed multiple
deeds of trust for the benefit of New Phase Investments, LLC ("New Phase"). R pp. 360-361.
The Insured Deed of Trust was recorded prior to any of New Phase's deeds of trusts. New Phase
Investments, LLC v. Jarvis, 153 Idaho 207,208,280 P.3d 710, 711 (2012).
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Default and Claims Litigation
Mr. Jarvis ultimately defaulted on his loan obligations.
Idaho at 208-09.280 P.3d at 711 1

Phase Investments.

1

On November 19, 2008, Mr. Jarvis and his wife filed a

petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy R. p. 511. q[ II. On or about November 26, 2008, the first
legal counsel to represent Snake River Funding and/or DAFCO. sent a self-styled "Notice of
Claim" letter to Stewart, but the letter did not seek any particular action by Stewart. R. pp. 63. q[
7, 89-90, 361, and 511, q[ 15. Nevertheless, Stewart retained Charles A. Homer of Holden
Kidwell Hahn & Crapo P.LLC. on December 17, 2008 to represent the insured. R. p. 512, q[ 17.
Mr. Homer objected to the Chapter 13 bankruptcy on behalf of the insured, and Mr.
Jarvis caused the bankruptcy action to be dismissed in February 2009. R. pp. 512, ~[20 and 525.
Mr. Jarvis filed for a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy on February 23,2009 (R. pp. 361,512, qr
24, and 525), once again pulling the spec home property into a bankruptcy and stay. R. pp.
361 and 513

~I

26. Mr. Homer worked diligently to get relief from the second bankruptcy stay.

R. p. 513 qr 26; Tr. p. 89, L 23 - p. 90, L 6. On July 24, 2009, the bankruptcy court released the
spec home property from the stay. R. pp. 513, qr 35, and 578-579.
Stewart entered into negotiations with New Phase on behalf of the insured to resolve the
priority of the various deeds of trust. R. p. 514,

~[~[

36-40; Tr. p. 90, Lns. 4-6. Snake River

Funding, DAFCO, and New Phase complicated and drew out the negotiations by switching legal
counsel during the negotiations. R. p. 514, qrqr 37-38. The negotiations were ultimately not
fruitful. R. p. 514, ~[40.
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On

1, 2010, Mr. Homer filed Bonneville County Case No. CV

10-624 on

behalf of Snake River Funding and DAFCO seeking to foreclose the fnsured Deed of Trust and
seeking a determination that DAFCO held a superior interest in the spec home property. R. p.
51

9[ 41. New Phase then filed a lawsuit (Bonneville County Case No. CV-201O-651) seeking

to foreclose its security in the spec home property, claiming, among other things, that it held an
interest superior to DAFCO. R. p. 514, 9I 42. The February L 2010 case (Case No. CV-201O624) was dismissed, and the parties proceeded to litigate the priority of the interests in the spec
home property under Case No. CV-201O-651 (the "Claims Litigation"). R. p. 514, 9[ 43.
On August 5,2010, the district court in the Claims Litigation issued a decision holding
the Insured Deed of Trust was void because Mrs. Jarvis did not sign it. R. pp. 361-362. Mr.
Homer, on behalf of Snake River Funding and DAFCO, appealed the district court's decision.
New Phase Investrnents, LLC, 153 Idaho at 208-709,280 P.3d at 714-15. On June 29, 2012, this

Court issued its decision reversing the district court and holding the Insured Deed of Trust was
valid and held first priority over any of the New Phase deeds of trust. Id. This Court specifically
held as follows:
DAFCO's deed oftrust is valid, not having been challenged by Rebecca. There is
no dispute but that DAFCO's trust deed was recorded prior to any of New
Phase's. Being the first-recorded encumbrance, DAFCO's trust has first priority.
Therefore, we ... hold DAFCO's deed to be the first priority encumbrance against
the Property.
Id. at 211-12,280 P.3d at 714-715 (citations omitted). DAFCO has admitted the decision

in New Phase Investments, LLC upheld the first position priority and validity of the
Insured Deed of Trust. R. p. 602, 9I 18; Tr. p. 62, Lns. 22-24.
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Disregardfor
The

Schedule and Deadlines

case was actively litigated for a

and several months

the district

court vacated hearings and trial dates on March 24, 2011. R. pp. 1-11 and 460-461. The parties
engaged in discovery prior to the March 24, 2012. R. p. 1. A motion for summary judgment, a
motion to dismiss, a motion to reconsider, and motions to amend the Complaint were also filed
and considered by the district court during that time. R. pp. 1-5.
Snake River Funding and DAFCO amended their Complaint for the first time on April
29,2010, but DAFCO made no effort to add AmeriTitle or to add to or clarify its existing claims
despite that any potential claims should have been known. R. pp. 1 and 22-43. In a motion for
summary judgment dated September 21,2010, Snake River Funding and DAFCO claimed they
were entitled to immediate and full payment without waiting for a final appeal decision regarding
the validity and priority of the Insured Deed of Trust. R. pp. 100-106. The district court denied
the motion and determined that, under the plain language of the Title Policy, Stewart had the
right to appeal the district court's decision in the Claims Litigation. R. p. 368-369.
On March 11,2011, Snake River Funding and DAFCO filed their Second Amended
Complaint. R. pp. 426-453. The Second Amended Complaint included the original claim
against Stewart for breach of the Title Policy and added claims against Stewart and AmeriTitle
for an "express and/or implied" contract to obtain the signature of Mrs. Jarvis. R. pp. 430-431.
Again, DAFCO made no effort to add other claims despite the fact that any potential claims
should have been known.
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After

Court issued its decision m

determined nothing in
pp.

decision created any conflicts

Lns. 10-14 and 83, Lns.

LLC the district court

Phase

interest that did not already exist. Tr.

10. The decision also did not create any claims that would not

have existed when the first Complaint was filed or when the first or second amended Complaints
were filed.
DAFCO's legal counsel sought to withdraw from representation after the decision in New
Phase Investments, LLC claiming a conflict of interest prevented further joint representation. Tr.

p. 83, Lns.

10; R. pp. 464-465. DAFCO's present legal counsel - its third - joined the case on

August 20, 2012. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. pp. 678-680 (timeline adopted by district court).
Counsel for Stewart and AmeriTitle made multiple calls to DAFCO's counsel throughout August
and September 2012 to discuss the status of the case in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
New Phase Investments, LLC. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. p. 678. DAFCO's attorney did not

return any of those phone calls. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. p. 678.
In the meantime, Snake River Funding also retained new counsel that determined the case
lacked merit and moved to dismiss its claims against Stewart and AmeriTitle. Tr. p. 26, Lns. 1118. DAFCO went the opposite direction. At a status conference on September 6,2012, counsel
for DAFCO told the district court that DAFCO was contemplating amending its Complaint for a
third time. Tr. p. 21, Lns. 1-9.
On September 20, 2012, Snake River Funding filed and served a Motion for Dismissal of
Plaintiff Snake River Funding, Inc. as Party Plaintiff. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. pp. 468-470 and
678. The motion was set for hearing on November 28,2012. Tr. p. 38, Lns. 14-24 and 77, Lns.
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Kp.

DAFCO never filed an objection to

Lns.l

R. pp. 1-11 and 679.
DAFCO kept the district court and other parties to the lawsuit guessing about how it
would proceed v,;ith the case. On October 10,2012, the district court held another status
conference. Tr. pp. 26-37. The parties discussed Snake River Funding's pending motion to
dismiss its claims. Tr. p. 26, Lns. 11-18. DAFCO's counsel again stated that he was "exploring
the possibility of claims" against Snake River Funding and a third amended Complaint "with
regard to the defendants' claims." Tr. p. 27, Lns. 14-25. Counsel for Stewart and AmeriTitle
expressed concern that DAFCO still had not articulated what those unpleaded claims might be.
Tr. p. 31, Lns. 4-7. Additionally, Snake River Funding had already filed its motion to dismiss its
own claims with prejudice. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. pp. 468-470 and 678.
At the district court's insistence, counsel for DAFCO agreed that he would determine
within two weeks (by October 24,2012) whether he would file a third amended Complaint. Tr.
p. 31, Lns. 10-21, p. 33, Lns. 1-5, p. 34, Lns. 20-25, and p. 35, L 1; R. p. 678. DAFCO did not
move to file a third amended Complaint within the two week deadline and did not notify the
district court of its intent to do so. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. pp. 7-8 and 678-679.
On October 11,2012, Stewart and AmeriTitle served DAFCO with Motions for
Summary Judgment documents (collectively, the "Motions for Summary Judgment") and a
Notice of Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. p. 678,

~[6.

Because DAFCO had not sought to file a third amended Complaint, the Motions for Summary
Judgment moved the district court on the claims set forth in Second Amended Complaint, which
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breach

contract

against Stewart based on the Title Policy and a

"express or implied contract to obtain the joiner of Mrs. Jarvis ... or obtain a release or
disclaimer of her interests" and a breach of contract claim against AmeriTitle based on an
unspecified "express or implied contract to obtain the joiner of Mrs. Jarvis ... or obtain a release
or disclaimer of her interests. R. pp. 430-431,

~r~[

27-35.

The Motions for Summary Judgment were originally scheduled for hearing on November
14.2012. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. p. 678, cJI 6. Counsel for Stewart and AmeriTitle later agreed
as a professional courtesy and at the request of DAFCO's counsel to reschedule the hearing on
the Motions for Summary Judgment to allow more time for DAFCO's counsel to respond. Tr. p.
77, Lns. 15-24; R. p. 679, ~[7. The new hearing date, December 12,2012, gave DAFCO nearly a
month longer to respond to the Motions for Summary Judgment making DAFCO's response
brief and supporting affidavits due on November 28, 2012. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. pp. 639,113,
and 678, 116. Despite being granted the lengthy extension, DAFCO, nevertheless, failed to file a
timely response to the Motions for Summary Judgment.
On November 28, 2012, the district court held a hearing on Snake River Funding's
motion to dismiss with prejudice its claims against Stewart and AmeriTitle. Tr. pp. 38-41 and
77, Lns. 15-24; R. p. 679, q[ 9. Counsel for DAFCO failed to appear at the hearing or file any
indication of whether it disputed Snake River Funding's motion. Tr. pp. 38-41, and 77, Lns. 1524; R. p. 679,

~[9.

The district court even called counsel for DAFCO on the day of the hearing,

but counsel for DAFCO was not in the office and did not respond to the district court's phone
calL Tr. pp. 38-41 and 77, Lns. 15-24; R. p. 679,119. The district court entered an order on

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF -15

dismissing

RIver Funding

prejudice Snake River Funding's claims against Ste\vart

and dismissing with
AmeriTitle. TL p.

Lns.l

R pp. 580-581, and 679, q[ 8.

Even after extensions had been granted, DAFCO continued to disregard every deadline.
On the evening of December 5, 2012, after close of business and after Stewart and AmeriTitle's
reply brief on their Motions for Summary Judgment would otherwise be due, counsel for
DAFCO fax-served on Stewart and AmeriTitle numerous documents including (among others) a
Motion to File a Third Amended Complaint, a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment, and an Affidavit in Support of Response in Opposition to Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. pp. 582-644, and 679, (J[ 1 L
DAFCO's documents responsive to the Motions for Summary Judgment were filed not
only a week late, after DAFCO had already been granted a month extension, but also on the day
Stewart and AmeriTitle's reply briefs would be due under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
I.R.C.P. 56(c); Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; and R pp. 679, q[ 11, and 701. In addition, the motion to
file the Third Amended Complaint was filed forty-two days after the district court's deadline for
filing such a motion and after Snake River Funding's claims against Stewart and AmeriTitle had
been dismissed with prejudice. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R pp. 679, q[ 11, and 701.
To put this in perspective, the motion to file the Third Amended Complaint came nearly
three years after the original Complaint R. p. 647, qr 1 L Even if the period during the appeal in
New Phase Investments, LLC is not taken into account, nearly two years elapsed. Not only had

the trial date been extended three times, but the corresponding discovery deadlines had been

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ~ 16

R. p.

q[<JI II 13. The extended discovery deadlines began expiring

before DAFCO's motion was set to be heard on December 19,

12.

days

p. 647, q[q[ 15 and 16.

The proposed Third Amended Complaint sought to add the following causes of action:
(1) Count I was described as a breach of contract claim against Stewart based on the Title Policy:
(2) Count II was described as a breach of contract claim against AmeriTitle based on the Closing
Instructions: (3) Count III was a "per se negligence" claim against Ste\vart and AmeriTitle based
on IDAPA Rule 18.0l.25; (4) Count IV was a negligence claim against AmeriTitle; (5) Count V
was a claim for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against Stewart and
AmeriTitle; and (6) Count VI was a breach of warranty claim against Snake River Funding,
which sought for Snake River Funding to indemnify and/or hold DAFCO harmless for its interest
in the property due to the alleged conduct of Stewart and AmeriTitle. R. pp. 594-597.

F. The District Court's Determination
On December 12, 2012, the district court held a hearing on Stewart and AmeriTitle's
Motions for Summary Judgment. Tr. pp. 42-93. The district court determined to proceed with
argument on DAFCO's motion to amend in addition to the Motions for Summary Judgment. Tr.
pp.42-45.
The district court examined the history of the case since its inception and adopted the
timeline as set forth by Stewart and AmeriTitle in Defendants' Response to DAFCO's Motions
to (1) Continue, (2) Allow Filing of Affidavit and Response Brief, and (3) Shorten Time: and
Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motions to Strike Affidavit and Response Brief. Tr. p.
77, Lns. 15-24; R. pp. 677-682. Ruling from the bench, the district court first addressed
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DAFCO's Motion to Amend
cause delay or prejudice:

examined three factors (1)
the pleadings set forth a

the amendment would
claim: and (3) whether an

opposing party has a valid defense. Tr. pp. 78-79. The district court discussed that the trial was
set for March 2013 and had been extended three times.

p.

Lns. 3-4. The district court

noted that if DAFCO's motion to amend was heard when scheduled "it would have been after
discovery and after the deadlines provided by the Court. Tr. p. 77, Lns. 7-10. The district court
described that DAFCO's o\\'n counsel admitted the nature of the claim did not change after the
decision in New Phase Investments, LLC. Tr. p.

Lns. 10-14. No legitimate reason existed for

DAFCO to not have originally pled the case as it sought to plead in the Third Amended
Complaint. As a result, the district court found that "any prejudice in this case would exceed any
justification to allow the amendment." Tr. p. 83, Lns. 20-22. The district court acknowledged
the prejudicial nature of adding parties previously dismissed from a case (as Snake River
Funding had). Tr. p. 83, Lns. 10-22. The district court also noted DAFCO had an opportunity to
oppose Snake River Funding's motion to dismiss. Tr. p. 83, Lns. 15-17. The district court held
there "appears to be no justification to permit the amendment at this state of the proceedings."
Tr. p. 84, Lns. 14-15.
The district court also ruled on the Motions for Summary Judgment, which addressed the
causes of action then pending before the court. The district COUIt examined the record and found
no material question of fact existed regarding the contract claims against either Stewart or
AmeriTitle. Tr. pp. 89-92. Regarding Stewart, the district court determined Stewart had fulfilled
its obligations under the Title Policy. Tr. pp. 89-92. Further, the district court concluded

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ·18

acted diligently in obtaining representation for DAFCO and retained counsel then
diligently handled the litigation permitted under the Title Policy.

. pp. 89-90. The district

court also found the Title Policy was the only contract that Stewart entered.

pp. 90,

25 and

91, L 1
Regarding AmeriTitle, the district court determined AmeriTitle was not a party to the
Title Policy and did not insure DAFCO under the Title Policy. Tr. p. 84, Lns. 9-11. Further,
DAFCO's claims against AmeriTitle for breach of contract could not survive the Motions for
Summary Judgment based on a lack of contractual duty, express or implied, between AmeriTitle
and DAFCO and a lack of privity between AmeriTitle and DAFCO. Tr. pp. 89-92. The district
court necessarily tied its analysis of DAFCO' s motion to amend to its analysis regarding the
Motions for Summary Judgment. Tr. pp. 92-93.

Attorney Fees on Appeal
Stewart and AmeriTitle are entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeaL The
Closing Instructions authorize AmeriTitle an award of attorney fees and costs that it incurs in
defending any actions or losses related to the Closing Instructions. R. p. 504, 'If 20. DAFCO
claims the Closing Instructions are the basis for its claims against AmeriTitle; hence attorney
fees and costs are awardable under the Closing Instructions. Stewart and AmeriTitle were the
prevailing parties below and should be the prevailing parties on this appeal. Additionally,
DAFCO concedes its claims against Stewart and AmeriTitle are commercial transactions.
Appellant's Briefp. 14. Therefore, Stewart and AmeriTitle are each entitled to attorney fees on

this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). I.C § 12-120(3). Accordingly, costs
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and AmeriTitle as a matter

be awarded to

should

course pursuant to Idaho

Appellate Rule 40. tAR. 40.
A vvards of attorney fees to Stewart and AmeriTitle are also appropnate under Idaho Code
Section I

121.

I.e.

§ 1 121.

it
121 is

to

even
it

to

Argument
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED DAFCO's MOTION TO AMEND.

A. Standard for Denying Motions to Amend.
The grant or denial of a motion to amend a pleading is within the discretion of the district
court Maroun v. Wyreless Sys. Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 612,114 P.3d 974, 982 (2005) (citations
omitted). The abuse of discretion standard is deferential to the district court. First Sec. Bank of
Idaho, NA v. Hansen, 107 Idaho 472, 480, 690 P.2d 927, 935 (1984) (holding the district court
is given a "large degree of discretion."). On appeal, the Court considers whether:
(1) the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court acted

within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with legal standards

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 20

applicable to specific
exercise of reason.

; and (3) the court reached

decision by an

State Ins. Fund v. jarolimek, 139 Idaho 137. 139,75 P.3d 191, 193 (2003).

Sufficient grounds to deny a motion to amend include undue delay, bad faith, dilatory
motive, or prejudice. IvIaroul1, 141 Idaho at 612, 114 P.3d at 982. In Weitz v. Green, the district
court was justified in determining the opposing party was prejudiced when the motion to amend
was made a year after filing the initial Complaint and would require additional evidence and
witness gathering. 148 Idaho 851, 858, 230 P.3d 743,750 (2009). A district court may also
deny a motion to amend if the amended pleading does not set out a valid claim, or if the
opposing party has an available defense. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First
Nat. Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1990).

The district court recognized the decision of whether to grant or deny the motion to
amend as an issue left to the discretion of the court and cited the various standards applicable to
motions to amend. Tr. pp. 79-84. DAFCO claims the district court did not reach its decision by
an exercise of reason. Appellant's Briefpp. 16-17. The record demonstrates otherwise.

B. The Motion to Amend Was Untimely, Constituted Undue Delay, and Was Prejudicial.
DAFCO asks the Court to ignore the history of the case prior to the decision in New

Phase Investments, LLC. This case was actively litigated for a year and several months before
the district court vacated hearings and trial dates on March 24,2011. R. pp. 1-5 and 460-461.
During that time, the parties engaged in discovery and the district court considered and decided a
motion for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss, a motion to reconsider, and motions to
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the Complaint

pp. 1 . Notably, the March

dates did not preclude DAFCO from moving forward on

11

hearings and trial
R. pp. 460-461.

Snake River Funding and DAFCO amended their Complaint twice before the district
court's order on March

2011. R. pp. 1, 4,22-43, and 426-453. When Snake River Funding

and DAFCO filed their Second Amended Complaint, DAFCO made no effort to clarify the
claims despite the fact any potential claims should have been known. R. pp. 1,4,22-43, and
426-453.
DAFCO provides no legitimate excuse for not including the claims sought to be added in
the proposed Third Amended Complaint in the prior three versions of the Complaint filed and
served by DAFCO. The district court correctly decided that nothing in this Court's decision in
New Phase Investments, LLC created any conflicts. Tr. pp. 83, Lns. 7-10. Additionally, the

decision did not create any claims that would not have existed when the first Complaint was filed
or when the first or second amended Complaints were filed. Tr. pp. 83, Lns. 7-10.
DAFCO's own Motion to File Third Amended Complaint recognized limits to a district
court's granting of leave to amend, such as when the "motion is made after court-imposed
deadlines, adds parties that were earlier dismissed, at a time that multiple discovery deadlines
had passed." R. p. 586 (citing Maroun, 141 Idaho 604, 114 P.3d 974). All of the elements cited
by DAFCO as reasons why a court may properly deny a motion to amend are present in this
case.
After the decision in New Phase Investments, LLC, DAFCO showed complete disregard
for the district court and the other parties in the litigation. DAFCO ignored the district court's
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set on October 10,2012 for DAFCO to

two
. pp.

and

, Lns. 1

R. pp. 7-8 and 678, (J[

to

an amended Complaint.

The failure to meet the deadline was

not only inexcusable but extremely prejudicial because Snake River Funding's claims against
Stewart and AmeriTitle were dismissed with prejudice after DAFCO failed to timely seek to file
an amended Complaint. DAFCO's failure to meet the district's court deadline is sufficient alone
to justify denying the motion to amend.
DAFCO's disregard for the district court's docket and the other parties continued when
DAFCO failed to appear at the November 28,2012 hearing on Snake River Funding'S motion for
dismissal of its claims. Tr. pp. 38-41 and 77, Lns. 15-24; R. p. 679, q[ 8. Based on the past
history of the case and DAFCO's decision not to seek to file an amended Complaint, the district
court entered an order on December 4,2012 dismissing Snake River Funding from the lawsuit
with prejudice. Tr. pp. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. pp. 580-581 and 679,

~[

8.

DAFCO bemoans that Snake River Funding "did not even appear" at the hearing on
DAFCO's motion to amend. Appellant's Briefp. 18. Yet Snake River Funding had already been
dismissed from the case and DAFCO never objected to the dismissal. DAFCO provides no
authority for the proposition that a party once dismissed from a lawsuit as a plaintiff must receive
notice of later motions to add the party as a new defendant. Appellant's Briefp. 21.
Despite Stewart and AmeriTitle's courtesy in rescheduling the hearing on their Motions
for Summary Judgment for a month later than originally noticed, DAFCO disregarded the
extension and did not file timely responses. On the evening of December 5,2012, after close of
business and after Stewart and AmeriTitle's reply brief on their Motions for Summary Judgment
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counsel for DAFCO
documents including a

on Stewart and

numerous motion

to File a Third Amended Complaint (forty-two days late from the

district court's deadline), a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment (a week late even after a one month extension), and an Affidavit in Support of
Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (a week late even after a
one month extension). Tr. p. 77, Lns. 15-24; R. pp. 582-644, and 679, ~[ 11.
The district court appropriately noted the motion to file the Third Amended Complaint
was filed:
•

After nearly three years elapsed from when the original Complaint Vias filed. R.
p. 647, ~11; Tr. 77, Lns. 15-24;
~

{II

After the trial date been extended three times. R. p. 647,

13; Tr. 77, Lns. 15-24;

{II

After the discovery deadlines had been extended for each trial reset. R. p. 647,

~[

13; Tr. 77, Lns. 15-24; and
It

The extended discovery deadlines began expiring five days before DAFCO's
motion was set to be heard on December 19, 2012. R. p. 647, ~ 15; Tr. p. 77,
Lns. 15-24.

DAFCO's repetitious disregard for deadlines and the history of the case must be viewed as a
whole when assessing the district court's decision to deny the motion to amend. Ultimately, the
district court could properly deny the motion to amend based solely on the timing of the motion
because of the numerous blown deadlines and the delay and prejudice created by DAFCO' s
actions.
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The Proposed Third Amended Complaint Did Not State Valid Claims.
The district court could properly deny DAFCO's motion to amend based solely on the
untimeliness of the request. However, the district court also properly determined the proposed
Third Amended Complaint did not state valid claims against Stewart or AmeriTitle

an

independent basis for denying the DAFCO's motion to amend.
Although this Court has stated a "trial court may not consider the sufficiency of evidence
supporting the claim sought to be added in determining leave to amend because that is more
properly determined at the summary judgment stage," it is "certainly proper for the district court
to consider whether the proposed amended complaint alleged valid claims." Maroun v. Wyreless

Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 612, 114 P.3d 974, 982 (2005). In this case, the district court made
certain foundational determinations as part of the pending Motions for Summary Judgment. The
district court was justified in relying on its determination of those issues when considering the
validity of the claims sought to be added under the motion to amend. Edmondson v. Shearer

Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75 P.3d 733, 740 (2003) ("The decision to grant or refuse
permission to amend is left to the sound discretion of the trial court where a party proposes to
amend its complaint when the record contains no allegation, which, if proven, would entitle the
party to the relief claimed.") (emphasis added).

a. Claims Against Stewart.
1.

Idaho law prohibits DAFCO' s negligence claims against Stewart.

DAFCO explains in the Appellant's Brief that the "claims pending under the Second
Amended Complaint, which were the subject of the summary judgment motions, were purely
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claims

Policy (against Steviart Title) and

Instructions (against

AmeriTitle)" and the Third Amended Complaint merely sought to add causes of action against
Stewart based in tort. Appella/1t's Briej'pp. 17 and 18. DAFCO describes the proposed claims
against Stewart in the Third Amended Complaint as negligence in the way AmeriTitle (not
Stewart) handled the escrmv closing and a second claim for bad faith in the way Stewart
"responded to and handled the claim by DAFCO under the policy." Appellant's Brielpp. 17 and
18.
DAFCO provides the Court with no legal authority for the proposition that a title insurer
is liable under tort principles for issuance of a title policy. Appel/ont's Briel p. 26. DAFCO cites
broadly to case law, provisions of the Idaho Code, and the Idaho Administrative Code (IDAPA),
but none of the cited authority actually sets forth a duty that a title insurer owes beyond the terms
of the title policy. Appellant's Briefp. 19-20 (citing All American Realty, Inc. v. Sweet, 107
Idaho 229, 230-231; 687 P.2d 1356,1357-1358 (1984); I.C. § 30-901 et seq.; I.C. § 41-101 et
seq.; and IDAPA 18.01.25). Rather, Idaho law limits tort claims related to issuance of a title

policy because contracts and policies are the source of the duties between the parties, not
negligence principles. Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. ol Idaho, 115 Idaho 56,
58, 764 P.2d 423, 425 (1988). The party asserting a duty beyond the title policy must show "the
act complained of was a direct result of duties voluntarily assumed by the insurer in addition to
the mere contract to insure title." Id. at 59, 764 P.2d at 426. DAFCO fails to set forth any such
duties.
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The portion of IDAPA cited by DAFCO as supporting a duty owed by Stewart further
belies DAFCO's tort claims against Stewart. Appellont's Briefp. 20; R. pp. 595-596. Section
18.01.25.01.d of the IDAPA, \vhich is cited by DAFCO, provides:
Issuance of a Policy. The preparation, execution and delivery of a title policy
which is hereby deemed to be only a contract of insurance up to the face amount
of such policy and in no way shall create a tort liability as to the condition of the
record insured from. The same shall include any necessary investigation just
prior to actual issuance of a policy to determine if there has been proper
execution, acknowledgement and delivery of any convevances, mortgage papers,
and other title instruments which may be necessary for the issuance of a policy.
IDAPA 18.01.25.01.d (emphasis added). This section of IDAPA clearly shows that no tort claim
can arise from the investigation prior to issuance of a policy or the execution, acknowledgement,
and delivery of any conveyances, mortgage papers, and other title instruments that may be
necessary for the issuance of a title policy. In the present case, this includes the execution of the
Insured Deed of Trust.
DAFCO's negligence claims based on the escrow transaction handled by AmeriTitle is
also not valid because Stewart was not a party to the escrow and Stewart performed no escrow
duties. R. p. 501, 'l[<JI 23-24; Tr. pp. 90-92. Accordingly, none of the authority DAFCO cites
regarding escrow duties applies to Stewart. See Appellant's Briefpp. 19-20 (citing All American
Realty, Inc., 107 Idaho at 230-231; 687 P.2d at 1357-1358; I.C. § 30-901 et seq.; and IDAPA
18.01.25.001.01). The district court determined Stewart was not a party to the Closing
Instructions and the Title Policy was the anI y contract Stewart entered. Tr. pp. 90-91.
Therefore, Stewart owed no duty, and no tort claim related to the escrow work is viable against
Stewart.
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alleged duty of good faith and fair dealing.
DAFCO later states the proposed Third Amended Complaint sought for the first time to
add a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Appellant's Brie(p. 21.
However, DAFCO confuses its own claim. On the one hand, it argues the claim for the breach
of the coyenant of good faith and fair dealing should not have been dismissed as part of the
Motions for Summary Judgment. which addressed the claims found in the Second Amended
Complaint, but on the other hand, it states the claim was only sought to be added under the Third
Amended Complaint. Compare Appellant's Briefp. 21 with p. 25. DAFCO cannot have it both
ways. Either the claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was included in
the Complaints before the proposed Third Amended Complaint or it was not. DAFCO also
confuses the nature of a claim for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it
first argues the claim is a tort and later argues it is also a contractual claim. Appellant's Brief p.
26. The claim is a tort claim. Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho
299,315,233 P.3d 1221, 1237 (2010). Regardless, none of the proposed amended claims
against Stewart are valid.
The insured carries the burden of demonstrating the elements of bad faith, which include:
"1) the insurer intentionally and unreasonably denied or withheld payment; 2) the claim was not

fairly debatable; 3) the denial or failure to pay was not the result of a good faith mistake; and 4)
the resulting harm is not fully compensable by contract damages." Robinson v. State Farm Mut.

Auto Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 176-177,45 P.3d 829, 832-833 (2002). Although DAFCO is
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about

such a claim is a tort claim and not a contract claim,

a cause

action rises and falls with the plain language of the contract. Idaho Fin,! Nat. Bank v. Bliss
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,288,824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991) CIT]he implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing cannot be inconsistent with the agreement executed by the parties.
'There is no basis for claiming implied terms contrary to the express rights contained in the
parties' agreement." [d. at 289,824 P.2d at 864 (quoting First Security Bank of1daho v. Gaige,
115 Idaho 172, 176, 765 P.2d 683, 687 (1988)).
The primary case relied upon by DAFCO, Weinstein, v. Prudential Property and
Casualty Insurance Co., completely contradicts DAFCO's assertion of a breach of the duty of

good faith and fair dealing. In Weinstein, the Court explained that "[aJIthough the tort of bad
faith is not a breach of contract claim ... there must also have been a duty under the contract that
was breached." 149 Idaho at 315, 233 P.3d at 1237. Further, the "covenant requires the parties
to perform, in good faith, the obligations contained in their agreement, but 'contract terms are not
overridden by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'" Id. at 316, 233 P.3d at 1238
(citing Van v. Portneuj Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 562, 212 P.3d 982, 992 (2009) and quoting
Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC 146 Idaho 764,768,203 P.3d 694,698 (2009)) (emphasis in

original) (citations omitted); see also White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 100, 730
P.2d 1014, 1020 (1986) ("[TJhe insured must show the insurer 'intentionally and unreasonably
denies or delays payment .... "').
Weinstein has no application to the present case because DAFCO cannot clear the first

hurdle of the four-prong test for bad faith claims. The district court determined the Title Policy
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not obligate

to make the payment demanded by DAFCO. Tr

84-89. Thus,

Stewart could not be accused of "intentionally and unreasonably" denying or withholding
payment The timeliness of a payment is not at issue \vhen the insurer is not obligated to pay.
The provisions of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA) cited by DAFCO
also do not support DAFCO's claims. Appel/ont's Brie/p. 22. The district court determined
Stewart acted diligently in obtaining counsel to represent DAFCO: as a result, Section 41-1329
(2) of UCSPA is not applicable. I.e. § 41-1329(2) ("Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably
promptly upon communications with respect to claims arising under insurance policies;"); Tr. pp.
85-90. The district court also determined Stewart satisfied its obligations under the Title Policy;
as a result, Sections 41-1329(6) and (13) of UCSPA are not applicable. I.e. § 41-1329(6) ("Not
attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which
liability has become reasonably clear;") (emphasis added) and (13) ("Failing to promptly settle
claims, where liability has become reasonably clear, under one portion of the insurance policy
coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy;")
(emphasis added); Tr. pp. 84-90.
The Title Policy

the only contract Stewart entered

is clear regarding Stewart's

obligations and precludes DAFCO's contract claims. Section 9(a) of the "Conditions" portion of
the Title Policy provides in pertinent part:
If the Company ... establishes the lien of the Insured Mortgage ... it shall have
fully performed its obligations with respect to that matter and shall not be liable
for any loss or damage caused to the Insured.
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K p. 69 (emphasis added). In

Phase Investments, LLC, this Court determined the Insured

Deed of Trust was valid and held first priority over any of the New Phase deeds of trust. 153
Idaho 207,211-212,280 P.3d 710, 7l

15. The matter was, in other words, already decided by

this Court Stewart has fully performed its obligations and is not liable for any alleged loss or
damage claimed by the Plaintiffs.
DAFCO asserts without any support from the Title Policy that Stewart beached the
contract because it held an "overarching duty of indemnifying the insured against actual
monetary loss or damage.

Appellant's Brief p. 27. The actual language of the Title Policy

repudiates DAFCO's assertion. Section 9(b) of the "Conditions" portion of the Title Policy
demonstrates that Stewart holds no liability for the alleged loss or damage claimed by DAFCO
not related to the validity of the Insured Deed of Trust. R. p. 69. Section 9(b) provides:
In the event of any litigation, including litigation by the Company or with the
Company's consent, the Company shall have no liability for loss or damage until
there has been a final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and
disposition of all appeals, adverse to the Title or to the lien of the Insured
Mortgage, as insured.
R. p. 69 (emphasis added). In other words, until and unless the lien of the Insured Deed of Trust
is adjudicated as defective, Stewart has no liability for any loss or damage. 2

Although not germane to the proposed amended claims against Stewart or AmeriTitIe,
DAFCO's claims against Snake River Funding appear to be invalid on the same grounds as those
against Stewart. The Corporate Warranty relied upon by DAFCO only warrants against "lawful
claims and causes" related to DAFCO's "interest pertaining to said premises." R. p. 549. If no
claim adverse to DAFCO's interest in the property was adjudicated as superior to DAFCO's
interest, the Corporate Warranty does not apply.
2
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DAFCO argues the district court's "focus on diligent litigation
the overall reasonableness of the

taken to fix the extent of monetary

to the exclusion of
was errOL

Appellant's Briefp. 27. Again, DAFCO disregards the actual language of the Title Policy.

Stewart held no obligation to DAFCO for any alleged damages not associated with an
adjudication of an actual defect in the Insured Deed of Trust.
Finally, no support exists in the Title Policy for DAFCO's assertion that Stewart was
required to compensate DAFCO by paying the policy amount as soon as the Insured Deed of
Trust was challenged by New Phase. Title insurance "does not represent that the contingency
insured against will not occur." Brmvll's Tie & LUlnber Co., 115 Idaho at 59, 764 P.2d at 426.
\Vhen New Phase challenged the Insured Deed of Trust, Stewart successfully defended the
validity and priority of the deed and fully satisfied all its obligations under the Title Policy.
DAFCO supplies no argument or facts refuting the district court's determination that Stewart
proceeded as reasonably as possible to retain counsel to represent DAFCO who then proceeded
diligently to defend against New Phase's challenge. Tr. 89-90.
Ultimately, the cause of DAFCO's alleged losses was its decision to obtain the loan
obligations of a borrower who could not repay his loan. Although Stewart insured the validity of
the Deed of Trust, Stewart did not insure Snake River Funding or DAFCO that they made a wise
business decision. Stewart did not guaranty the loan would be repaid, and Stewart did not insure
a particular profit DAFCO may believe it deserves. The insurance policy was a title insurance
policy

not a business profit insurance policy. Stewart met its obligations under the Title Policy
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to insure that the Insured Deed of Trust constituted a valid lien. which is all that was
Ste\\'art under the unambiguous language

of

the Title

The Title Policy is clear and unambiguous regarding Stewart's obligations: Stewart
could "institute and prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any other act that in its opinion
may be necessary or desirable to establish the Title or the lien of the Insured Mortgage, as
Insured, or to prevent or reduce loss or damage to the Insured:' R p, 69, § 5(b), Stewart did so,
and this Court determined the Insured Deed of Trust was valid and held a first position priority,
b, Claims Against AnleriTitle,
L

DAFCO was not a party to the Closing Instructions. and AmeriTitle owes no
duty to DAFCO that would be necessary to support a contract or tort claim

"It is axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a contract.

'Privity' refers to 'those who exchange the [contractual] promissory words or those to whom the
promissory words are directed, ", Wing v, Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 272, 688 P,2d 1172. 1177
(1984) (quoting Calemari and Perillo, Contracts § 17-1 (2d ed, 1977)). Courts in other
jurisdictions have determined escrow agents do not owe a duty to a party that is not a party to the
escrow agreement or closing. Mark Properties, Inc. v, National Title, Co., 34 P.3d 587, 590-91
th

(Nev. 2001); Pope v. Saving Bank of Puget Sound, 850 F.2d 1345, 1353-54 (9 Cir. 1988)
(holding no fiduciary relationship between escrowee and individual that was not a party to the
closing).
DAFCO was not a party to the Closing Instructions and lacked privity with AmeriTitie.
Tr. p. 92, Lns. 4-8. As argued more fully below, AmeriTitle owed no duty to DAFCO under the
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Closing Instructions, and DAFCO cannot bring tort claims against AmeriTitle based on duties
that

not exist in the Closing Instructions. Tr. p.

Lns.4-8. Even if DAFCO was a party to

the Closing Instructions to AmeriTitle, the Closing Instructions did not and could not require
AmeriTitle to obtain the signature of Mrs. Jarvis for any party. Tr. p. 90, Lns. 4-8.
ii. The plain language of the Closing Instructions did not require AmeriTitle to
obtain the signature of Mrs. Jarvis for any party.
None of the authority cited by DAFCO requires an escwv,: agent to comply with a duty
greater than the duties set forth in the closing instructions to the escrow agent. Appellant's Briel
pp. 19-20 and 29 (citing All American Realty, Inc., 107 Idaho at 230-231; 687 P.2d at 13571358; I.C § 30-901 et seq.; I.C § 41-101 et seq.; and IDAPA 18.01.25). The primary case cited
by DAFCO, All American Realty, Inc. v. SVv'eet, provides as follows:
Where a person assumes to and does act as the depositary in escrow, he is
absolutely bound by the terms and conditions of the deposit and charged with a
strict execution of the duties voluntarily assumed. He is held to strict compliance
with the terms of the escrow agreement; and he may not perform any acts with
reference to handling the deposit, or its disposal, which are not authorized by the
contract of deposit.
107 Idaho at 230,687 P.2d at 1357 (quoting Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 16) (emphasis added). The
section of IDAPA that DAFCO cites as authority for the duty owed by AmeriTitle provides the
following:

Written Instructions. An escrow agent shaH not accept funds or papers in
escrow without a dated, written instruction signed by the parties or their
authorized representatives adequate to administer the escrow account and without
receiving at the time provided in the escrow instructions sufficient funds and
documents to carry out terms of the escrow instructions. Funds and documents
deposited shall be used only in accordance with such written instruction; and if
additional specific instructions are needed, the agent shall obtain the consent of
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both parties or such representatives to the escrow or an order of a court of
competent jurisdiction at
expense of the escrmv parties.
IDAPA 18.01.25.011.01 (emphasis added). In other words, the duties and obligations owed by
AmeriTitle are only those set forth in the Closing Instructions provided by Snake River Funding
and Mr. Jarvis. The district court determined as part of the Motions for Summary Judgment and
the motion to amend that AmeriTitle satisfied those obligations. Tr. pp. 81-83 and 90-91
The district court's decision was correct because the Closing Instructions do not support
DAFCO's contract or tort claims against AmeriTitle. The Closing Instructions to AmeriTitle
provide as follows:
We, the undersigned, hereby instruct AmeriTitle, hereinafter referred to as
"Closing Agent", when in receipt of all documents and monies as set out herein to
close this transaction according to the following instructions and information.
TITLE INSURANCE: Insurer AmeriTitle Order No. 10-44797
X Extended coverage loan policy Amt. 3268,000.00 in a 1st Lien Position
When the closing agent has received all properly executed documents and all
funds necessary for the completion of this transaction and the title insurer is in a
position to issue the type of policy(s) set out above, subject only to the General
Exceptions on Schedule B-Section I and Schedule B-Section 2 Special Exceptions
No.'s 1-9 as set out in their commitment dated 3/10/08 and any documents
recorded in cormection with this transaction, the closing agent is hereby
authorized and instructed to record or file all necessary documents and disburse
funds deposited in accordance with the amounts shown on the closing statement.
R. pp. 508-509. DAFCO claims the foregoing language required AmeriTitle to obtain the
signature of Mrs. Jarvis. It does nothing of the sort.
DAFCO reaches this conclusion based on a misreading of the Closing Instructions and
the title commitment issued by Stewart. The Closing Instructions provide that AmeriTitIe was
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authorized and instructed to record or file all necessary documents and disperse funds
AmeriTitle received all properly

(1)

documents and all funds and (2) the title insurer

(Stewart) was ready to issue the Title Policy (Order No. 10-44797) based on the title insurer's
requirements contained in the title commitment. R. pp. 508-509. There are two items to keep in
mind regarding the title commitment. The title commitment expired when the Title Policy was
issued. TI'. p. 48. The title commitment contained Stewart's own requirements to issue the Title
Policy, not requirements for AmeriTitle to complete as escrowee.
Stewart ultimately determined it was in a "position to issue" Title Policy Order No. 1044797. Nothing in the Closing Instructions required AmeriTitle to second guess that
determination. Additionally, the language of the title commitment cited by DAFCO is
requirement number "5" for issuance of the title policy. Appellant's Brief p. 11. Requirement
number "5" is not one of the "General Exemptions" or "Special Exemptions" described in the
Closing Instructions. R. pp. 434-437.
Furthermore, AmeriTitle was under no obligation to determine "legally" whether Mrs.
Jarvis's signature was required. DAFCO wants the Court to believe AmeriTitle should act as an
attorney and give legal advice regarding which parties should sign documents submitted to
escrow. DAFCO not only asks the Court to permit the unauthorized practice of law, but to
actually require it. There is no reason to take this drastic step. Particularly as this Court
determined, the signature in question was not necessary for the validity or priority of the Insured
Deed of Trust. It would be absurd for AmeriTitle to be bound to obtain such a signature when,
as a matter of law, it was not adjudicated as necessary.
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if the decision in
River Funding, the party to the

Phase Investments, LLC had turned out differently, Snake
Instructions, clearly acknowledged that AmeriTitIe had

no obligation to provide legal counsel to Snake River Funding, R. pp, 503-504, 9f~117-20, and
508-509, Snake River Funding knew that AmeriTitle was not acting as Snake River Funding's

representative. R. pp. 503-504,

1m 17-20, and 508-509.

Snake River Funding also clearly

acknowledged that AmeriTitIe was merely acting as scrivener under the direction from Snake
River Funding to provide a form deed of trust to it. R. pp. 503-504, 9f(fi17-20, and 508-509.
The closing instructions signed by Snake River Funding provide in pertinent part:
BY THEIR EXECUTION OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS, THE BUYER AND
SELLER ACKNOWLEDGE THE FOLLOWING:
1) The closimr agent is not acting as a representative of either party,
3) Any documents typed by the closing agent have been done so at our direction
or the direction of our counsel,
4) The closing agent is not licensed to practice law and no legal advice, advice as
to the content of the documents, nor advice as to the merits of the transaction
has been offered by the closing agent,
8) THE CLOSING AGENT HAS ADVISED THE PARTIES HERETO TO
SEEK THE ADVICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IF ANY PART OF
THIS TRANSACTION IS NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD.
R. pp. 503-504 9f9f 17-20, and 509 (underlined emphasis added).
Snake River Funding entered into its transaction with this clear language. AmeriTitle
undertook no obligation to provide legal advice or obtain a signature that did not prevent
issuance of the Title Policy by Stewart and that was determined by this Court as not necessary to
uphold the validity and priority of the Insured Deed of Trust. The only instructions given to
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which were contained

the Closing Instructions signed

clearly provide otherwise. DAFCO provides no explanation as to why AmeriTitle v\ould owe a
greater duty to DAFCO than the duty it mved to Snake River Funding, who was an actual party
to the Closing Instructions. Accordingly, neither the tort claims nor contract claims by DAFCO
based on the Closing Instructions survive a motion for summary judgment standard or the motion
to amend standard for valid claims.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDG;\IENT DISMISSING THE
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST STEWART.

3

A. DAFCO Alleges Questions of~laterial Fact Exist Regarding Its Bad Faith Claim Against
Stewart Based on Language that Does Not Exist in the Title Policy.
DAFCO claims without support that Stewart owed a duty to indemnify DAFCO against
actual monetary loss or damage regardless of whether the Insured Deed of Trust was
enforceable. Appellant's Brie/pp. 26-27. DAFCO's argument assumes that Stewart was
required to pay on the Title Policy regardless of the validity of the Insured Deed of Trust.

Appellant's Brie/pp. 26-27. DAFCO then leaps to the conclusion that a question of material fact
exists regarding when Stewart should have paid DAFCO. Appellant's Briefp. 27. As argued
previously, the Title Policy does not support DAFCO' s position.
DAFCO specifically cites to the "Payment of Loss" language in Section 11 of the Title
Policy. Appellant's Brief p. 26. Section 11 of the Title Policy provides "[ w Jhen liability and the
extent of loss or damage have been definitely fixed in accordance with these Conditions, the

3 D AFCO has not challenged the district court's dismissal of the third cause of action against
Stewart in the Second Amended Complaint. See Appellant's Brief
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payment shall be made within 30 days.

p.69. DAFCO neglects to provide the Court with

the language from the Title Policy that triggers an obligation by Stewart to pay under the Title
Policy. Again, Section 9 of the Title Policy provides in pertinent part:
(a) If the Company .. establishes the lien of the Insured Mortgage .. it shall
have fully performed its obligations with respect to that matter and shall not
be liable for any loss or damage caused to the Insured.
(b) In the event of any litigation, including litigation by the Company or with the
Company's consent, the Company shall have no liability for loss or damage
until there has been a final determination bv a court of competent jurisdiction.
and disposition of all appeals, adverse to the Title or to the lien of the Insured
Mortgage, as insured.
R. p. 69 (emphasis added). In other words, Stewart is under no obligation to pay the insured for
loss or damage unless and until the Insured Deed of Trust was determined unenforceable by a
court of competent jurisdiction. That never occurred, so the thirty day payment deadline was not
triggered. The district court properly determined Stewart diligently satisfied its obligations
under the Title Policy. Tr. pp. 89-90.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST AMERITITLE BASED ON THE CLOSING
4
INSTRUCTIONS.

DAFCO asserts lack of privity was the district court's sole basis for granting
AmeriTitle's motion for summary judgment on the Closing Instructions claims. Appellant's
Briefp.28. DAFCO also claims privity was raised for the first time in AmeriTitle's reply brief

in support of the Motions for Summary Judgment and this somehow created confusion regarding

DAFCO has not challenged the district court's dismissal of the third cause of action against
AmeriTitle in the Second Amended Complaint. See Appellant's Brief

4
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the current status

law regarding privity. Appellant's Briefp.

DAFCO's assertions are

not true.
AmeriTitle raised lack of privity with DAFCO under the Closing Instructions as an issue
in its initial brief filed in support of the Motions for Summary Judgment two months before the
hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment. R. pp. 481, 483. It is ironic that DAFCO
complains privity was raised by AmeriTitle "in its reply brief filed only one day before the
hearing on the motion." Appel/ant's Briefp. 28. As set forth at length above, DAFCO ignored
virtually every deadline after new counsel appeared for DAFCO following the decision in New

Phase Investments, LLC. Even more ironic, DAFCO's incredibly late response brief was filed
on the due date of AmeriTitle' s reply brief making AmeriTitle's reply brief necessarily late.
DAFCO claims it satisfies privity with AmeriTitle under the Closing Instructions in two
ways: (1) as an assignee of the deed of trust and note between Snake River Funding and Mr.
Jarvis and (2) as a third-party beneficiary of the Closing Instructions. Appellant's Brief pp. 2829. Neither claim satisfies privity.

A. DAFCO Was Not an Assignee of the Contract It Seeks to Enforce - The Closing
Instructions.
DAFCO does not explain how, even if all of its allegations made in the Appellant's Brief
are taken at face value, an assignment to DAFCO of a deed of trust and note between Snake
River Funding and Mr. Jarvis equates to assignment of the Closing Instructions and attendant
escrow obligations. DAFCO claims the alleged duties for its claims arise from the Closing
Instructions alone and not the note or Insured Deed of Trust. Appellant's Briefp. 29 C[T]here is
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at

least a question of

as to \vhether there was privity of contract between AmeriTitle

and DAFCO as to the closing escrow agreement, including the Closing Instructions.

Yet, no

evidence on record or even allegations made by DAFCO indicates the Closing Instructions were
assigned to DAFCO. See R.

592,1[ 20. In fact, the escrovv had closed when the Insured Deed

of Trust was assigned to DAFCO. R. p. 548. Thus, according to DAFCO's own allegations,
which were not even part of the record before the district court when it ruled on the Motions for
Summary Judgment, DAFCO was not an assignee of the document it seeks to enforce

the

Closing Instructions.

B. Status as Third-party Beneficiary.
Intended third-party beneficiary status is not easy to obtain. This Court explained the
elements necessary to establish a third-party beneficiary claim as follows:
When a contract is made expressly for the benefit of a third person, the contract
may be enforced by the third person at any time before the parties to the contract
rescind it. Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572,579,97 P.3d 439, 446 (2004);
I.C § 29-102. "The test for determining a party's status as a third party
beneficiary ... is whether the agreement reflects an intent to benefit the third
party." Idaho Power Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110, 112,90 P.3d 335, 337 (2004).
The third party must show the contract was made primarily for his benefit; it is
not sufficient that the third party is a mere incidental beneficiary to the contract.
Id. (quoting Adkison Corp. v. Am. Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 409,690 P.2d 341,
344 (1984»; Fenwick v. Idaho Dep't oj Lands, 144 Idaho 318,323,160 P.3d 757,
762 (2007) (quoting Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331,337,372 P.2d 414,418
(1962) (quoting Sachs v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 148 F.2d 128,131 (7th
Cir.1945»). The intent to benefit the third party must be expressed in the contract
itself. Idaho Power Co., 140 Idaho at 112,90 P.3d at 337 (quoting Adkison Corp.,
107 Idaho at 409,690 P.2d at 344;) Fenwick, 144 Idaho at 323, 160 P.3d at 762
(quoting Adkison Corp., 107 Idaho at 409,690 P.2d at 344).
Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 687,183 P.3d 771,775 (2008) (emphasis added).
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The

Instructions simply

benefit DAFCO. The only ,',n,,,·,,'.,

not express any intent to specifically or primarily

to DArCO appears on an instruction from Snake River

Funding and Mr. 1arvis to AmeriTitle to provide a form assignment of deed of trust to Snake
River Funding. R. pp. 508-509. The Closing Instructions are otherwise silent about DAFCO. R.
pp. 508-509. The loan fees were to be paid to Snake River Funding and all documents were
provided to Snake River Funding.
In any event the actual parties to the Closing Instructions - Mr. 1arvis and Snake River
Funding

clearly understood AmeriTitle was merely acting as a scrivener and undertook no

obligation to assure the legality of the form documents provided to Mr. 1arvis and Snake River
Funding. Therefore, the district court correctly determined no issues of material fact existed
regarding DAFCO's contract claims against AmeriTitle. As set forth previously, the absence of
contractual obligations to DAFCO under the Closing Instructions also invalidates the tort claims
that DAFCO sought to add in the proposed Third Amended Complaint.
Conclusion

The district court properly granted both Motions for Summary Judgment. No genuine
issues of material fact exist regarding the contractual claims DAFCO made against Stewart. The
only contract obligations of Stewart were contained in the Title Policy, and Stewart satisfied
those obligations. Idaho law prohibits tort claims based on issuance of a title policy. Therefore,
none of the negligence claims DAFCO sought to allege against Stewart in the Third Amended
Complaint would even survive a motion to dismiss. The claim for a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing (bad faith) against Stewart is unsupportable because Stewart fulfilled
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its obligations in the underlying contract

the Title Policy

and no obligation to pay was ever

triggered.
AmeriTitle owed no duties to DAFCO under either the Title Policy or thc Closing
Instructions. In the first instance, AmeriTitle was not a party to the Title Policy. In the second
instance, DAFCO was not a party to the Closing Instructions and lacked privity with AmeriTitle.
Moreover, the plain language of the Closing Instructions did not obligate AmeriTitle to obtain
Mrs. Jarvis signature. AmeriTitle was acting as a mere scrivener in preparing the Insured Deed
of Trust.
The District Court properly exercised its discretion in denying DAFCO's motion to
amend. The long history of the case prior to the decision in New Phase Investments, LLC cannot
be ignored. If DAFCO wanted to be treated as if the lawsuit only began after the decision,
DAFCO should have waited until after the Claims Litigation and appeal were completed and
then filed this action. Regardless, DAFCO failed to meet every court deadline after the decision
in New Phase Investments, LLC. Its actions constituted undue delay and created real prejudice
for the other parties. At some point, a district court and litigants need to be able to rely on court
rules and deadlines to properly serve justice. DAFCO's motion to amend would work an
injustice if granted, and the appeal should be denied with costs and attorney fees on appeal
awarded to Stewart and AmeriTitle.
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